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THE LAW OF ABOLITION 
KEVIN M. BARRY* 
Three themes have characterized death penalty abolition throughout the 
Western world: a sustained period of de facto abolition; an understanding of 
those in government that the death penalty implicates human rights; and a 
willingness of those in government to defy popular support for the death 
penalty.  The first two themes are present in the U.S.; what remains is for the 
U.S. Supreme Court to manifest a willingness to act against the weight of 
public opinion and to live up to history’s demands. 
When the Supreme Court abolishes the death penalty, it will be traveling 
a well-worn road.  This Essay gathers, for the first time and all in one place, 
the opinions of judges who have advocated abolition of the death penalty 
over the past half-century, and suggests, through this “law of abolition,” 
what a Supreme Court decision invalidating the death penalty might look 
like.  Although no one can know for sure how history will judge the death 
penalty, odds are good that the death penalty will come to be seen as one of 
the worst indignities our nation has ever known and that a Supreme Court 
decision abolishing it will, in time, be widely accepted as right. 
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In an influential book written over thirty years ago, Professors Franklin 
Zimring and Gordon Hawkins identified three common themes that have 
characterized the abolition of the death penalty throughout the Western 
world: (1) a sustained period of de facto abolition; (2) a recognition by those 
in government that the death penalty is a “human rights issue” rather than an 
individual, criminal justice issue; and (3) a willingness of those in 
government to defy the weight of public opinion.1  According to Zimring and 
Hawkins, these common themes are not part of a single coordinated 
international strategy or the conscious appropriation of tactics that have 
proved successful in other countries that have abolished the death penalty.2  
Instead, the commonality is unconscious; it is “simply . . . how the abolition 
of capital punishment happens in modern democracies.”3  The question, then, 
is not whether the U.S. will join the ranks of abolitionist nations, but rather 
when.  Applying Zimring and Hawkins’s three themes, the answer hinges on 
the willingness of the U.S. Supreme Court to act against the weight of public 
opinion and live up to history’s demands.4 
 
1  FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE AMERICAN 
AGENDA 21–23 (1986).  Zimring and Hawkins also noted a fourth, and somewhat 
counterintuitive, theme of abolition: popular support for the death penalty.  Id at 21–22.  This 
theme is discussed below.  See infra notes 41–42 and accompanying text (discussing public 
opposition to abolition of death penalty).  
2  Id. at 19. 
3  Id.; see also id. at 23 (“[T]hese elements accompany the end of capital punishment, the 
normal pattern of abolition that provides a standard of comparison with development in the 
United States . . . .”). 
4  See, e.g., CAROL S. STEIKER & JORDAN M. STEIKER, COURTING DEATH: THE SUPREME 
COURT AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 4–5, 289 (2016) (stating that “the death penalty will not last 
much longer in the United States,” and that judicial abolition “seems likely in the coming 
decade or two—but only if justices who leave the current Court are replaced with justices who 
hold similar or more liberal views”); see also State v. Webb, 750 A.2d 448, 458 (Conn. 2000) 
(Norcott, J., dissenting) [hereinafter Webb II] (“I am optimistic that very early in the twenty-
first century we will all witness the abolition of this practice by Connecticut as a state and the 
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When the U.S. Supreme Court abolishes the death penalty, it will not be 
going it alone.  Indeed, for over a half-century, at least thirty-five federal and 
state judges have concluded that the death penalty is unconstitutional per se.5  
And they have done so for remarkably similar reasons—namely, objective 
criteria detailing the death penalty’s unacceptability to contemporary society, 
the subjective determination that the death penalty no longer serves any 
legitimate penological purpose, and a recognition that the death penalty 
violates human dignity.6  Taken together, these decisions form a coherent 
body of law—the “law of abolition”—on which the Supreme Court should 
rely. 
Part I of this Essay discusses why abolition depends upon the Supreme 
Court’s willingness to defy public opinion.  Part II compiles and analyzes 
those judicial opinions advocating abolition of the death penalty, and 
suggests, through this “law of abolition,” what a Supreme Court decision 
invalidating the death penalty might look like.  Part III argues that a Supreme 
Court decision abolishing the death penalty will, in time, be widely accepted 
as right.  Part IV offers some concluding remarks. 
I.  THE DEATH PENALTY’S NUMBERED DAYS 
In their 1986 book, Capital Punishment and the American Agenda, 
Professors Zimring and Hawkins boldly predicted U.S. abolition of the death 
penalty in the early part of the twenty-first century:7 
[Abolition] will not happen as a consequence of a major decline in the rate of violent 
crime . . . .  It will not happen because of a dramatic abatement in the ideological conflict 
between the proponents of hard- and soft-line approaches to crime control policy.  Nor 
will it occur because of research findings that would constitute proof that the death 
penalty is no more a deterrent to murder than is imprisonment [or] . . . because of a 
single precipitating event—for example, the execution of an individual subsequently 
proved innocent.8 
Instead, Zimring and Hawkins argued, U.S. abolition will come about 
in much the same way it has come about in the rest of the Western world—
 
United States as a country.”); Richard C. Dieter, The Future of the Death Penalty in the United 
States, 49 RICH. L. REV. 921, 921 (2015) (“There are . . . concrete reasons to believe that the 
story of the death penalty in the United States may be approaching its final chapter.”). 
5  See infra Part II. 
6  Id. 
7  ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 1, at 157 (predicting in 1986 that the last execution 
was “more likely to occur in fifteen years than in fifty years,” and that “the Supreme Court 
will ultimately preside over the formal disestablishment of the death penalty” at a substantially 
later date).  
8  Id. at 149. 
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when three themes are present.  First, there will be a sustained period of de 
facto abolition, represented by a diminution in death sentences and a lack of 
actual executions in a majority of states.9  Second, among at least some of 
those in government, there will be a recognition of what Zimring and 
Hawkins call “[t]he human rights linkage”—that is, the understanding that 
the death penalty is a human rights issue rather than solely a criminal justice 
issue committed to the sovereignty of individual states.10  And third, there 
will be leaders in government willing to defy the weight of public opinion.11  
Applying these three themes, abolition hinges on the Supreme Court’s 
willingness to lead—not follow—public opinion. 
A. DE FACTO ABOLITION 
Historically speaking, countries seldom give up their death penalties 
cold turkey.12  Instead, “a lengthy transition period between the end of 
executions and the formal repudiation of all capital punishment” is generally 
required.13  This is especially true for countries with federalist governments, 
where the gap between the first and last abolitionist jurisdiction is often 
decades-long.14 
This transition appears to be underway in the U.S. Over the past two 
decades, the death penalty has lost much of the acceptance it once enjoyed.  
Nineteen states have abolished the death penalty de jure by either 
legislatively repealing death penalty statutes or judicially abolishing the 
death penalty.15  Eleven more states have abolished the death penalty de 
 
9  Id. at 21 (discussing de facto abolition).  Analogizing to the Supreme Court’s legalization 
of abortion, Zimring and Hawkins suggest that U.S. abolition of the death penalty will not 
require that all states abolish de facto; a majority of American states will do.  See id. at 154 
(stating that the Supreme Court’s decision protecting the right to abortion in Roe v. Wade came 
“after a majority of all American states had liberalized their grounds for legal abortion . . . .”). 
10  Id. at 23. 
11  Id. at 154–56. 
12  See ROGER HOOD & CAROLYN HOYLE, THE DEATH PENALTY, A WORLDWIDE 
PERSPECTIVE 18 (5th ed. 2015) (discussing long delayed abolition in U.K., Netherlands, 
Portugal, and Italy).  Notably, since 1989, a majority of countries—including Romania, the 
Czech and Slovak Republics, Cambodia, Latvia, South Africa, and Turkmenistan—have 
abolished the death penalty within ten or fewer years of their last executions.  Id. 
13  ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 1, at 156. 
14  Id. at 152 (discussing Switzerland and Australia). 
15  See States With and Without the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. (Nov. 9, 
2016), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/states-and-without-death-penalty [hereinafter DPIC, 
States].  These states are: Alaska, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, 
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North 
Dakota, Rhode Island, Vermont, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and the District of Columbia.  Id. 
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facto; they have not executed anyone in a decade or more.16  All told, thirty 
states—nearly two-thirds of the country—have turned their backs on the 
death penalty.17 
Although twenty states with the death penalty have imposed the death 
penalty in the past decade, the number of executions nationwide has steadily 
declined.18  In 2016, there were only twenty executions—a twenty-five-year 
low.19  With the exception of two executions in Alabama and one each in 
Florida and Missouri, all of those executions occurred in just two states: 
Georgia and Texas.20  Prior years have followed a similar pattern.  In 2015, 
there were twenty-eight executions, all but two of which occurred in Florida, 
Georgia, Missouri, and Texas.21  And in 2014, there were thirty-five 
executions, all but five of which occurred in the same four states.22  The death 
penalty’s symphony of support has been reduced to a lonely quartet. 
The death penalty’s overwhelming loss of acceptance is confirmed by a 
nationwide drop in new death sentences—from modern era highs of more 
than 300 annually in the mid–1990s to modern era lows of eighty-five or 
fewer since 2011, culminating in a forty-year low of just thirty death 
sentences in 2016.23  The 2016 ouster of prosecutors in four of the sixteen 
 
16  See Executions by State and Year, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/node/5741 (last visited Oct. 24, 2016).  These states are 
California, Colorado, Kansas, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Carolina, 
Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Wyoming.  In three of the eleven states—Colorado, Oregon, and 
Pennsylvania—governors have declared moratoria on executions.  Death Penalty in Flux, 
DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. (Feb. 6, 2007), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-penalty-
flux.  Generally speaking, death sentences in these eleven states are correspondingly rare.  
Over the past ten years, there have been no death sentences handed down in Montana and 
Wyoming, one in New Hampshire, two each in Colorado and Nebraska, six in Kansas, ten in 
Oregon, and fourteen and eighteen in Nevada and North Carolina, respectively.  Death 
Sentences in the United States From 1977 By State and By Year, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-sentences-united-states-1977-present (last visited Oct. 
24, 2016). 
17  DPIC, States, supra note 15.  
18  Executions by Year, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. (Aug. 25, 2017), 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/executions-year. 
19  Id. 
20  Execution List 2016, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/ 
execution-list-2016 (last visited Oct. 24, 2016). 
21  Execution List 2015, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/ 
execution-list-2015 (last visited Oct. 24, 2016). 
22  Execution List 2014, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/ 
execution-list-2014 (last visited Oct. 24, 2016). 
23  See DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., DEATH PENALTY IN 2016: YEAR END REPORT 1, 3, 
http://deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/2016YrEnd.pdf [hereinafter DPIC REPORT] (last 
visited Oct. 24, 2016). 
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counties that impose the most death sentences in the U.S., and the election of 
prosecutors who oppose the death penalty or have pledged to reform their 
county’s death penalty practices, supports this conclusion.24  So, too, does the 
reelection of Washington Governor Jay Inslee, who imposed a moratorium 
on executions in 2014.25 
B. HUMAN RIGHTS LINKAGE 
As of 2016, 104 countries—over half of the world—have abolished the 
death penalty for all crimes.26  Seven more countries have abolished the death 
penalty for all “ordinary crimes” and another thirty have not executed anyone 
over the past decade, yielding a total of 141 abolitionist countries, or well 
over two-thirds of the world.27  Only fifty-seven countries retain the death 
penalty, and only five countries other than the U.S. use it with it any 
frequency: China, Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan.28 
A centerpiece of the worldwide evolution away from the death penalty 
has been the emergence of international human rights law and its 
commitment to “the protection of citizens from the power of the state and the 
tyranny of the opinions of the masses.”29  Over the past twenty-five years, 
numerous international human rights instruments have transformed the use 
of the death penalty from an issue of state sovereignty—one “decided solely 
or mainly as an aspect of national criminal justice policy”—to “a 
fundamental violation of human rights: not only the right to life but the right 
to be free of excessive, repressive, and tortuous punishments.”30 
 
24  Id. at 9–10; see also Frances Robles & Alan Blinder, Florida Prosecutor Takes a Bold 
Stand Against Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2017, at A21 (discussing decision by chief 
prosecutor in Orlando, Florida to no longer seek death penalty). 
25  DPIC REPORT, supra note 23, at 9.  
26  Abolitionist and Retentionist Countries, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. (Dec. 31, 2016), 
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/abolitionist-and-retentionist-countries.  
27  Id. 
28  Id.; The Death Penalty: An International Perspective, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-penalty-international-perspective (last visited Oct. 24, 
2016).  China, Iran, and Saudi Arabia have regularly executed twenty or more people (and, 
sometimes, hundreds or even thousands of people) every year for the past decade.  Id.  Iraq 
and Pakistan have regularly executed large numbers of people over the past decade, although 
not every year.  Id.  Several other countries, including Yemen, Sudan, and Egypt, have also 
executed large numbers of people, although with far less frequency than the six countries listed 
above.  Id. 
29  HOOD & HOYLE, supra note 12, at 22. 
30  Id.; see also Protocol No. 13 to the Convention for Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, Concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty In All 
Circumstances, 1 E.T.S. No. 187 (2002) https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommon 
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This human rights linkage has informed the U.S. Supreme Court’s death 
penalty jurisprudence.  Although the Court has eschewed reliance on 
international human rights norms, it has not ignored them.31  In recent death 
penalty decisions, the Court has found support in the practices of the world 
community, which, in turn, rely on international human rights law.32  For 
example, in Roper v. Simmons, the Court supported its prohibition of the 
death penalty for crimes committed by juveniles by stating that “the United 
States is the only country in the world that continues to give official sanction 
to the juvenile death penalty.”33  Similarly, in Atkins v. Virginia, the Court 
prohibited the death penalty for those with intellectual disabilities, noting that 
“within the world community, the imposition of the death penalty for crimes 
committed by mentally retarded offenders is overwhelmingly 
disapproved.”34 
The Court’s reliance on “dignity”—a concept used consistently 
throughout international human rights law, including in its charter, the 1948 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights35—suggests further acknowledgment of the 
human rights perspective.  Over the past forty years, the Court has 
successively restricted imposition of the death penalty, using dignity as the 
touchstone for gauging who may receive the death penalty, the procedures 
under which the death penalty may be imposed, and the means by which the 
 
SearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=0900001680081563 (abolishing the 
death penalty “in all circumstances” on grounds that “[the] right to life is a basic value in a 
democratic society and . . . the abolition of the death penalty is essential for the protection of 
this right and for the full recognition of the inherent dignity of all human beings”)”; Protocol 
No. 6 to the Convention for Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
Concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty, 1 E.T.S. No. 114 (1983) 
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Library_Collection_P6_ETS114E_ENG.pdf (abolishing 
the death penalty in times of peace); Chapter I, Article 2 of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union, 2000 OJ (C 364), 9 (Dec. 18, 2000) 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/pdf/text_en.pdf (stating that “[e]veryone has the right 
to life” and “[n]o one shall be condemned to the death penalty, or executed”). 
31  Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) (“The opinion of the world community, 
while not controlling our outcome, does provide respected and significant confirmation for 
our own conclusions.”). 
32  Id. at 578 (“[T]he express affirmation of certain fundamental rights by other nations 
and peoples simply underscores the centrality of those same rights within our own heritage of 
freedom.”). 
33  Id. at 575. 
34  536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002); cf. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 80–82 (2011) 
(discussing foreign and international law’s support for prohibition of life without parole for 
juvenile non-homicide offenders). 
35  G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, U.N. Doc. A/810 at 72 
(Dec. 10, 1948) (affirming the “dignity and worth of the human person”).   
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death penalty may be carried out.36  Although the Court has yet to hold that 
the death penalty per se violates human dignity under the Eighth Amendment, 
it is inevitable that it one day will.37 
The human rights linkage, moreover, is not confined to the Court’s death 
penalty jurisprudence.  State legislators have invoked human rights norms in 
support of repealing the death penalty,38 as have governors when imposing 
moratoria on executions39 and commuting death sentences.40 
 
36  See Barry, infra note 61, at 400–11 (discussing role of dignity in Supreme Court’s 
Eighth Amendment death penalty jurisprudence); Bharat Malkani, Dignity and the Death 
Penalty in the United States Supreme Court, 44 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 145, 160–61 (2017); 
accord. Robert J. Smith & Zoë Robinson, Constitutional Liberty and the Progression of 
Punishment, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 413, 461–65 (2017). 
37 See, e.g., William J. Brennan, Jr., The 1986 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. Lecture, 
Constitutional Adjudication and the Death Penalty: A View from the Court, 100 HARV. L. REV. 
313, 331 (1986) (“I believe that a majority of the Supreme Court will one day accept that when 
the state punishes with death, it denies the humanity and dignity of the [condemned] and 
transgresses the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.”).  
38  See, e.g., Senator Raymond Lesniak: The Road to Justice and Peace , DEATH PENALTY 
INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/senator-raymond-lesniak-road-justice-and-peace (last 
visited Oct. 24, 2016) (arguing “that the death penalty violates the fundamental human rights 
of mankind”). Conservative legislators have similarly invoked “the right to life” in support of 
abolishing the death penalty. Compare, e.g., Statement from Concerned Conservative 
Nebraskans: Conservatives and Republicans Call for Repeal of Nebraska’s Death Penalty, 
NEBRASKANS FOR ALTERNATIVES TO THE DEATH PENALTY (May 1, 2015), 
http://nadp.net/statement-from-concerned-conservative-nebraskans/ (discussing Nebraska 
state legislators’ opposition to death penalty on grounds that it violates “the right to life”), and 
Ben Jones, The Republican Party, Conservatives, and the Future of Capital Punishment, J. OF 
CRIM. L. AND CRIMINOLOGY (forthcoming 2017) (discussing support for death penalty repeal 
legislation among Republican state legislators based, in part, on pro-life beliefs), with 
FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE CONTRADICTIONS OF AMERICAN CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 27–28 
(2003) (characterizing “the right to life” as “the most fundamental of human rights,” and 
discussing the international campaign to transform consideration of the death penalty from “an 
isolated issue of criminal justice” to an “attack[] on fundamental human rights, of which the 
right to life is but the first”). 
39  See STATE OF COLORADO OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR, EXECUTIVE ORDER: DEATH 
SENTENCE REPRIEVE 3 (May 22, 2013), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/COexe 
cutiveorder.pdf (declaring moratorium on use of death penalty and noting that “two-thirds of 
countries worldwide have abolished the death penalty in law or in practice . . . .”).  
40  In Ryan’s Words: I Must Act, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. (Jan. 11, 2003), 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/ryans-words-i-must-act (commuting death sentences and 
noting that “the United States is not in league with most of our major allies: Europe, Canada, 
Mexico, most of South and Central America.  These countries rejected the death penalty.  We 
are partners in death with several third world countries. Even Russia has called a 
moratorium.”). 
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C.  LEADERSHIP FROM THE FRONT 
Where abolition has come about in other countries, “it has not been as a 
result of the majority of the general public demanding it.”41  Indeed, Zimring 
and Hawkins could not find any “examples of abolition occurring at a time 
when public opinion supported the measure.”42  When countries abolish the 
death penalty, it is instead the result of what Zimring and Hawkins call 
“leadership from the front”—“responsible agents manifest[ing] a willingness 
to act against public opinion.”43 
One obvious reason for the gap between public opinion and the 
government is perspective: the public views the death penalty from afar, like 
an amateur astronomer gazing at the moon.44 From a distance, the death 
penalty appears as “an important legal threat, abstractly desirable as part of 
society’s permanent bulwark against crime.”45  But government actors—
particularly judges—do not share this luxury of distance.  Those “closer to 
the nexus between policy and practice, between ‘the death penalty’ as statute, 
and killing people as punishment” see the death penalty as it truly is, with all 
of its imperfections laid bare.46 
The U.S. experience is emblematic of the divide between popular 
support for the death penalty and political leadership against it.  According 
to an October 2016 Gallup poll, 37% of respondents answered “no” when 
asked whether they were “in favor of the death penalty for a person convicted 
of murder.”47  Although this is the highest rate of death penalty opposition in 
 
41  HOOD & HOYLE, supra note 12, at 426 (emphasis in original); see also ZIMRING AND 
HAWKINS, supra note 1, at 21–22 (“Majorities of two-thirds opposed to abolition were 
associated with abolition in Great Britain in the 1960s, Canada in the 1970s, and the Federal 
Republic of Germany in the late 1940s.”) (emphasis added)  . 
42  ZIMRING AND HAWKINS, supra note 1, at 22.  “[P]ublic opinion or perception almost 
invariably follows tradition, and the death penalty as symbol is certainly traditional.”  Id. at 
13.  Once abolition is accomplished, however, “the death penalty . . . ceases to be a pressing 
public issue” and “support for the death penalty diminishes.”  Id.  For example, in 1948, one 
year before Germany abolished the death penalty, 74% of German respondents supported 
retention of the death penalty; 21% supported abolition.  In 1980, over thirty years after 
Germany abolished in 1949, only 26% of German respondents supported retention, and 55% 
supported abolition.”  Id. 
43  Id. at 155–56. 
44  Id. at 22 (“[T]he difference between public attitudes and the government’s or 
legislators’ view may often be, in part, not so much a difference in opinion as a difference in 
perspective.”). 
45  Id. at 22 (quoting Hugo Bedau). 
46  Id.  
47 Death Penalty, GALLUP, http://www.gallup.com/poll/1606/death-penalty.aspx (last 
visited Oct. 24, 2016). 
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forty-five years, 60% answered yes (down 20% from an all-time high of 80% 
in 1994).48  On November 8, 2016, voters in California rejected a referendum 
to abolish the death penalty (53% to 46%), 51.1% of voters voted to hasten 
the execution process in California, 61% of voters in Nebraska reinstated the 
death penalty that the state legislature repealed in 2015, and two-thirds of 
Oklahoma voters passed a referendum that amended their constitution to 
permit the death penalty.49 
Despite popular (albeit declining) support for the death penalty, various 
government leaders have taken action to end it.  At the state level, legislative 
leadership has led to repeal of the death penalty in five states over the past 
decade: New Jersey (2007), New Mexico (2009), Illinois (2011), Connecticut 
(2012), and Maryland (2013).50 In 2015, the Nebraska legislature repealed 
the death penalty over a gubernatorial veto; voters reinstated the death 
penalty by referendum in 2016.51  Executive leadership at the gubernatorial 
level has completely halted executions in Colorado, Washington, Oregon, 
and Pennsylvania, and has resulted in the commutation of death sentences in 
New Jersey, Maryland, Illinois, and several other states.52  Leadership among 
district attorneys has likewise resulted in fewer death sentences.53  And three 
 
48  Id. 
49  DPIC REPORT, supra note 23, at 8–9. 
50  See DPIC, States, supra note 15. 
51  Nebraska, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/nebraska-1 
(last visited Oct. 24, 2016). 
52  See Death Penalty in Flux, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. (Feb. 6, 2007), 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-penalty-flux; Clemency, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., 
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/clemency. 
53  See, e.g., John Gleeson, Supervising Federal Capital Punishment: Why the Attorney 
General Should Defer When U.S. Attorneys Recommend Against the Death Penalty, 89 VA. L. 
REV. 1697, 1718 & n.72 (2003) (discussing Governor George Pataki’s removal of “Bronx 
County District Attorney Robert Johnson from a high-profile murder prosecution when he 
refused to seek the death penalty”); Robles & Blinder, supra note 24 (quoting newly elected 
chief prosecutor of Orlando, Florida, Aramis Ayala, who announced in 2017 that her office 
would no longer pursue death penalty: “I am prohibited from making the severity of sentences 
the index of my effectiveness.  Punishment is most effective when it happens consistently and 
swiftly.  Neither describe the death penalty in this state.”); Montana Assistant Attorney 
General Calls for Death Penalty Repeal, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/new-voices-prosecutors-and-attorneys (quoting Montana 
Assistant Attorney General’s 2007 testimony to the Montana House Judiciary Committee in 
support of death penalty repeal: “It seems to me to be the ultimate incongruity to say we respect 
life so much that we’re going to dedicate all our money, all our resources, our legal expertise 
and our entire system to try and take your life. . . .  Frankly, I just don’t think I can do it 
anymore.”); see also Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2774 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(“[T]he number of active death penalty counties is small and getting smaller.”); DPIC REPORT, 
supra note 23, at 9–10 (discussing 2016 defeat of Alabama, Florida, and Texas prosecutors 
BARRY 10/10/17  5:42 PM 
2017] THE LAW OF ABOLITION 531 
 
state supreme courts—California (1972), Massachusetts (1980), and 
Connecticut (2015)—have struck down the death penalty as unconstitutional 
per se, although voters in California and Massachusetts later abrogated the 
decisions of their high courts by amending their state constitutions to permit 
the death penalty.54 
In our federal system, the actions of state legislatures, governors, and 
state supreme courts can only do so much; to abolish the death penalty, it will 
take federal action.55  Congress could pass a law prohibiting the death 
penalty, but it is unlikely to do so on such a divisive issue.56  The President 
could halt federal executions and pardon federal prisoners, but this is 
similarly unlikely, as is the U.S. Attorney General’s refusal to authorize 
federal prosecutors to seek the death penalty.57  In any event, these executive 
 
“in four of the 16 counties that imposed the most death sentences in the U.S.” by candidates 
“who expressed personal opposition to the death penalty or pledged to institute reforms in the 
county’s death penalty practices”). 
54  DPIC, States, supra note 15; see Commonwealth v. Colon-Cruz, 470 N.E.2d 116, 117–
18, 124 (Mass. 1984) (discussing Massachusetts constitutional amendment abrogating judicial 
abolition of the death penalty in Suffolk Dist. v. Watson, 411 N.E.2d 1274 (Mass. 1980), and 
holding unconstitutional the death penalty provisions of MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 265, § 2); 
People v. Frierson, 599 P.2d 587, 605 (Cal. 1979) (discussing California constitutional 
amendment abrogating judicial abolition of the death penalty in People v. Anderson, 493 P.2d 
880 (Cal. 1972)).  Connecticut has not abrogated judicial abolition of the death penalty in State 
v. Santiago, 122 A.3d 1, 10–11 (Conn. 2015) [hereinafter Santiago II], although three 
legislators have introduced legislation that would do so.  Dave Collins & Associated Press, 3 
Connecticut Lawmakers Call for Restoring the Death Penalty, NEW HAVEN REGISTER (Feb. 
12, 2017), http://www.nhregister.com/government-and-politics/20170212/3-connecticut-
lawmakers-call-for-restoring-the-death-penalty.   
Delaware’s and New York’s high courts have each ruled that their respective death penalty 
statutes (but not their death penalties per se) are unconstitutional, and neither state has enacted 
new death penalty legislation.  Delaware, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/delaware-1 (last visited Oct. 24, 2016); New York, DEATH 
PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/new-york-1 (last visited Oct. 24, 
2016). 
55  ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 1, at 153 (“[E]xecutions represent a manifestation of 
state autonomy that continues to influence state and local decision makers . . . . [U]nless the 
states’ rights struggle spontaneously ends, nationalization of the death penalty issue appears 
to be a necessary component in the timely achievement of abolition.”). 
56  Id. (“Congress is characterized by consistent timidity, lacking a tradition of moral 
leadership . . . .”). 
57  See LINDA E. CARTER et al., UNDERSTANDING CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 311, 422–23 (3d 
ed. 2012) (discussing president’s authority to grant clemency for people convicted of federal 
crimes, and U.S. Department of Justice protocol that requires the Attorney General to 
authorize U.S. Attorneys to pursue death penalty prosecution for federal crimes).  Federal 
grants of clemency applications have declined sharply over the past forty years for a multitude 
of reasons, including the rise of tough-on-crime politics.  Rachel E. Barkow, The Ascent of the 
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actions would apply only to people convicted of federal crimes.58 
This leaves the U.S. Supreme Court, the branch whose membership is 
insulated from public opinion59 and “whose exercise of moral leadership is 
supported by a long historical tradition,” as the best bet to abolish the death 
penalty for good.60  In 2015, the Supreme Court seemed poised to do so.61  
That year, in Glossip v. Gross, four Supreme Court Justices—Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, Elena Kagan, and Sonia Sotomayor—dissented 
from a decision upholding Oklahoma’s lethal injection protocol, and the 
former two Justices stated that it was “highly likely that the death penalty 
 
Administrative State and the Demise of Mercy, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1332, 1348–49 (2008).  
Since the reinstatement of the federal death penalty in 1988, clemency has been granted to 
only two federal death row inmates—one in 2001, under President Clinton, and the second in 
2017, under President Obama.  Federal Death Row Prisoners, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. 
(July 25, 2017), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/federal-death-row-prisoners.  In 2017, 
President Obama also granted clemency to a military death row prisoner. President Obama 
Commutes Two Death Sentences, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., 
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/node/6657 (last visited Oct. 24, 2016). 
Similarly, no Attorney General formally halted federal death penalty prosecutions during this 
period.  See CARTER et al., supra note 57, at 422–23 (discussing Attorneys General Reno and 
Ashcroft); Matt Apuzzo, Obama Administration Steps Back From Effort to End Federal Death 
Penalty, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2015, at A1 (discussing Attorneys General Holder and Lynch).  
On the contrary, between 1988 and 2010, the Attorneys General approved 466 defendants for 
federal capital prosecutions, and three defendants were executed.  See CARTER et al., supra 
note 57, at 423.  
58  See CARTER et al., supra note 57, at 311, 422–23 (discussing presidential pardon power 
and DOJ protocol regarding federal death penalty). 
59  The experience of state judges illustrates the importance of Supreme Court leadership.  
When state courts have abolished the death penalty outright or reversed death sentences on a 
case-by-case basis, “[t]he offending judges have sometimes been removed in retention 
elections, though veiled hints alone have usually sufficed to secure compliance with popular 
will.  Lacking the institutional wherewithal of the federal courts, state judges must either relent 
or face ouster.”  Stephen P. Garvey, Politicizing Who Dies, 101 YALE L.J. 187, 207 (1991); 
see, e.g., Phyllis Goldfarb, Matters of Strata: Race, Gender, and Class Structures in Capital 
Cases, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1395, 1419–20 (2016) (discussing efforts to defeat elected 
justices); Ronald J. Tabak, The Death of Fairness: The Arbitrary and Capricious Imposition 
of the Death Penalty in the 1980s, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 797, 846 (1986) 
(discussing “effort[s] to defeat sitting justices because of their death sentence votes.”); 
Christopher Keating, House, Senate Approve Justice Palmer For Another Term On Supreme 
Court Bench, HARTFORD COURANT (Mar. 8, 2017), http://www.courant.com/politics/hc-
justice-palmer-votes-20170308-story.html (discussing unusually close vote in state senate to 
confirm the reappointment of Justice Richard N. Palmer, who authored the 2015 decision 
abolishing Connecticut’s death penalty). 
60   ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 1, at 155. 
61  See, e.g., Kevin M. Barry, The Death Penalty & the Dignity Clauses, 102 IOWA L. REV. 
383, 388, 388 n.23 & 418 (2017) (predicting that the Supreme Court will soon declare the 
death penalty unconstitutional). 
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violates the Eighth Amendment.”62  Approximately three months later, and 
shortly before his death, Justice Antonin Scalia told an audience of college 
students that four of his colleagues on the Court believe that the death penalty 
is unconstitutional, and that he “wouldn’t be surprised” if the Court abolished 
it.63  The fate of the death penalty, it appeared, lay in the thoughtful hands of 
Justice Anthony Kennedy, whose soaring opinions supporting LGBT rights 
and limiting the class of people eligible to receive the death penalty have 
“push[ed] ‘dignity’ closer to the center of American constitutional law and 
discourse.”64 
But predictions about Justice Kennedy’s willingness to join his four 
colleagues in abolishing the death penalty were premature. It is rumored that 
Justice Kennedy will soon retire from the bench.65  Should he do so within 
the next three years, the populist and pro-death penalty president, Donald 
Trump, will almost certainly replace Kennedy with a conservative Justice 
unlikely to support judicial abolition.66 
Notwithstanding this setback for abolition, statistics detailing our 
moribund death penalty and its numerous flaws, coupled with an Eighth 
Amendment doctrine rooted in human dignity that largely turns on such 
statistics, are cause for optimism.67  While not imminent, judicial abolition is 
inevitable.  In the words of Zimring and Hawkins, 
Although both the public mood and the ideology of governments fluctuate dramatically 
in relatively short periods of time, in the history of the Western world those fluctuations 
 
62  135 S. Ct. 2726, 2776–77 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting); see id. at 2797 (Sotomayor, 
J., dissenting). 
63  See Debra Cassens Weiss, Scalia Says He “Wouldn’t be Surprised” If SCOTUS 
Overturns the Death Penalty, ABA J., (Sept. 24, 2015), 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/scalia_says_he_wouldnt_be_surprised_if_scotus_ov
erturns_the_death_penalty. 
64  Laurence H. Tribe, Equal Dignity: Speaking Its Name, 129 HARV. L. REV. F. 16, 21 
(2015); see also Barry, supra note 61, at 404–11 (discussing line of Supreme Court cases 
categorically prohibiting the imposition of death penalty because of insanity, intellectual 
disability, youth, and non-homicide character of crime).  
65  See Cody Derespina, Chuck Grassley Expects Supreme Court Resignation This 
Summer, FOX NEWS (Apr. 20, 2017), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2017/04/20/chuck-
grassley-expects-supreme-court-resignation-this-summer.html (discussing rumored 
retirement). 
66  See Ariane de Vogue & Joan Biskupic, Conservatives Prepare for Justice Anthony 
Kennedy’s Retirement, CNN (May 2, 2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/05/01/politics/justice-
anthony-kennedy-retirement-rumors/ (discussing list of conservative judges and lawyers to 
replace Justice Kennedy). 
67  See supra Part I.A–B (discussing death penalty’s loss of acceptance and line of Supreme 
Court cases holding that application of death penalty violates human dignity under Eighth 
Amendment). 
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occur within a larger continuous movement of developing social and political trends 
. . . . [T]he movement for abolition of capital punishment . . . . aris[es] from ‘beliefs in 
the personal value and dignity of the common man that were born of the democratic 
movement of the eighteenth century.  In this longer-term perspective the transience and 
marginal significance of current fashion is clear . . . . We see the Court changed not by 
personnel or a single event but by a sense of the necessity of living up to history’s 
demands.68 
In short, the Supreme Court’s decision to abolish the death penalty will 
ultimately derive from its understanding that there is a right side of history 
and from the Court’s commitment to being on that side. 
II. THE LAW OF ABOLITION 
Having discussed why abolition ultimately depends upon the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s willingness to act against public opinion, this essay now 
looks back at the history of judicial abolition of the death penalty.  The goals 
of this part are modest and few: to gather, for the first time and all in one 
place, the opinions of judges who have advocated abolition of the death 
penalty for over the past half-century, and to suggest, through these opinions, 
what a Supreme Court decision invalidating the death penalty might look 
like.69 
A. THE REASONS FOR JUDICIAL ABOLITION 
When a majority of the Supreme Court abolishes the death penalty, it 
will not be going it alone.  Members of the judiciary, including several current 
 
68  ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 1, at 158. 
69  As its title suggests, this essay does not include judges’ extrajudicial statements—of 
which there are many—opposing the death penalty. See, e.g., People v. Bull, 705 N.E.2d 824, 
846 (Ill. 1998) (Freeman and McMorrow, JJ., concurring) (citing to A. KAUFMAN, CARDOZO 
395 (1998) in a discussion of U.S. Supreme Court Justice Benjamin Cardozo’s statements in 
opposition to death penalty prior to becoming a judge); STUART BANNER, THE DEATH 
PENALTY: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 238–39, 288 (2002) (discussing public and private 
statements opposing death penalty by U.S. Supreme Court Justices Felix Frankfurter, Tom 
Clark, Earl Warren, Robert Jackson, and Lewis Powell); New Voices - Judiciary, DEATH 
PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/new-voices-judiciary (last visited Oct. 24, 
2016) (collecting statements of federal and state court judges in opposition to death penalty).  
Because judges who advocate abolition do not often cite the abolitionist opinions of other 
judges, the list of opinions contained in this Essay is almost certainly under-inclusive.  The 
author welcomes additions.  For other articles compiling judicial opinions that advocate 
abolition of the death penalty, see, for example, Mary R. Falk & Eve Cary, Death-Defying 
Feats: State Constitutional Challenges to New York’s Death Penalty, 4 J.L. & POL’Y 161, 182 
& nn.98–99 (1995); Stephen P. Garvey, Politicizing Who Dies, 101 YALE L.J. 187, 206 n.116 
(1991); and James R. Acker & Elizabeth R. Walsh, Challenging the Death Penalty Under 
State Constitutions, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1299, 1331 n.150 (1989).  
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and former Supreme Court Justices, have not been silent on this issue.  In all, 
at least thirty-five federal and state judges have concluded that the death 
penalty is unconstitutional per se.70  This is “the law of abolition.”  Although 
their opinions span well over a half-century, their reasons for abandoning the 
death penalty are remarkably similar, and can be summed up as follows: 
1.   Objective criteria detailing the death penalty’s unacceptability to 
contemporary society, as gleaned from statutory repeals, the rarity 
of executions and death sentences, and the worldwide trend toward 
abolition. 
2.    A determination that the death penalty no longer serves any 
legitimate penological purpose, as gleaned from several sub-
factors: 
a.   The inherently arbitrary administration of the death penalty; 
b.   The inherently discriminatory administration of the death 
penalty; 
c.   The inherent unreliability of the death penalty; 
d.   The inherently long delays in imposing the death penalty; 
e.   The illegitimacy of retribution as a goal of punishment; and 
f.   The excessive pain involved in the administration of the 
death penalty—both physically, in terms of execution, and 
also mentally, in terms of waiting for execution. 
3.   And, lastly, the recognition that the death penalty violates human 
dignity.71 
When the Supreme Court again turns to the constitutionality of the death 
penalty, one can expect many of these factors to weigh heavily in the Court’s 
Eighth Amendment analysis.72 
B. THE HISTORY OF JUDICIAL ABOLITION 
The history of judicial abolition begins in 1963, when newly appointed 
Supreme Court Justice Arthur Goldberg circulated a memo to his fellow 
Justices, arguing that the death penalty was per se cruel and unusual under 
the Eighth Amendment.73  In support of his argument, Justice Goldberg 
 
70  See infra Part II.B (discussing judicial opinions arguing—and, in some cases, holding—
that death penalty is unconstitutional per se). 
71  See infra Part II.B (compiling cases). 
72  For other helpful analyses of what a Supreme Court decision abolishing the death 
penalty might look like, see, for example, STEIKER & STEIKER, supra note 4, at 271–85 and 
Barry, supra note 61, at 418–28.  
73  See STEIKER & STEIKER, supra note 4, at 41; BANNER, supra note 69, at 248–49. 
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pointed to the death penalty’s unacceptability to contemporary society, as 
measured by its abolition among a number of states and “[m]any, if not most, 
of the civilized nations of the western world”; public opinion polls showing 
only 42% to 51% support for the death penalty; and the risk of executing 
innocent people.74  “[W]hatever may be said of times past,” Goldberg wrote, 
“the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of [our] maturing 
society now condemn as barbaric and inhuman the deliberate 
institutionalized taking of human life by the state.”75  According to Justice 
Goldberg, the death penalty also failed to “achieve the permissible ends of 
punishment.”76  He found “no persuasive evidence that capital punishment 
uniquely deters capital crime,” and he rejected “vengeance” (i.e., retribution) 
as an unacceptable goal of punishment.77 
A majority of the Court did not share Justice Goldberg’s opinion, and 
that is putting it lightly.  As legal historian Stuart Banner has written, Chief 
Justice Earl Warren “was furious,” fearing that publication of the 
memorandum would encourage defiance of desegregation efforts.78  Justices 
Marshall Harlan and Hugo Black were similarly aghast.79 
In an opinion dissenting from a denial of writ of certiorari in the case of 
Rudolph v. Alabama, Justice Goldberg reframed his original per se attack on 
the death penalty as a call for consideration of whether the death penalty was 
unconstitutional as applied to non-homicide crimes.80  According to 
Professor Banner, Justice Goldberg’s dissent “rang like an alarm clock in the 
 
74  Arthur J. Goldberg, Memorandum to the Conference Re: Capital Punishment, 
October Term, 1963, 27 S. TEX. L. REV. 493, 501 (1986) (“The concept of innocence has, of 
course, at least two meanings when used by a court.  A person is ‘innocent’ if he is not the one 
who committed the crime.  A person is also innocent, regardless of whether or not he 
committed the crime, if his conviction was improperly secured. The thought of innocent 
men—in the first sense—being executed in any substantial number would certainly be enough 
to condemn the penalty of death in most people’s eyes.  This Court is equally concerned with 
the possibility of innocent men—in the second sense—being executed.”). 
75  Id. at 499 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
76  Id. at 502. 
77  Id. at 502–03.  Justice Goldberg further found that the death penalty obviously did not 
rehabilitate, nor did it serve the isolation goal of punishment more effectively than 
imprisonment for life. 
78  BANNER, supra note 69, at 250; see also STEIKER & STEIKER, supra note 4, at 41–42. 
79  BANNER, supra note 69, at 250. 
80  375 U.S. 889, 890–91 (1963) (Goldberg, J., dissenting) (suggesting that death penalty 
for non-homicide crimes may be: a violation of “evolving standards of decency . . . ,” 
“disproportion[ate] to the offense[] charged,” or “unnecessary” to serve a “permissible aim[] 
of punishment” given less severe penalties). 
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offices of civil rights lawyers.”81  Although individual defense lawyers had 
been raising constitutional challenges to the death penalty in individual cases 
as early as 1950, by the late 1960’s, a network of highly skilled lawyers at 
the ACLU and the NAACP Legal Defense Fund were consistently raising 
these challenges in a large number of cases.82 
These arguments were initially met with resistance by courts.  For 
example, in Sims v. Balkcom, the Supreme Court of Georgia had this to say 
about Goldberg’s dissent in Rudolph: 
[W]ith all due respect to the dissenting Justices [in Rudolph], we would question the 
judicial right of any American judge to construe the American Constitution contrary to 
its apparent meaning, the American history of the clause, and its construction by 
American courts, simply because the numerous nations and States have abandoned 
capital punishment for rape.83 
But several state supreme court judges answered Justice Goldberg’s 
call.84 
1. Abolition and Revival: 1971–1976 
In 1971, in Adams v. State, two Indiana Supreme Court Justices argued 
in dissenting opinions that the death penalty was cruel and unusual under the 
state and federal constitutions.85  Justice Roger DeBruler provided multiple 
reasons why the death penalty was unacceptable to contemporary society.  
Like the Goldberg memorandum, he pointed to the abolition of the death 
penalty in a number of states (including in Indiana, where a repeal bill was 
vetoed) and throughout the world, as well as polling data suggesting a lack 
of support for the death penalty.86  He also offered a litany of other reasons 
for the death penalty’s unacceptability, including the rarity of executions and 
 
81  BANNER, supra note 69, at 250. 
82  Id.; see also Dist. Attorney for Suffolk Dist. v. Watson, 411 N.E.2d 1274, 1278 (Mass. 
1980) (“Following the Rudolph dissent, a large number of cases were brought to the Supreme 
Court squarely presenting the issue of the constitutionality of the death penalty . . . .”) (quoting 
Arthur J. Goldberg, The Death Penalty and the Supreme Court, 15 ARIZ. L. REV. 355, 365 
(1973)).  
83  136 S.E.2d 766, 769 (Ga. 1964) (emphasis added); see also Ralph v. Pepersack, 335 
F.2d 128, 141 (4th Cir. 1964) (rejecting proposition “recently mentioned and discussed by 
Justice Goldberg in dissenting from the majority decision denying certiorari in Rudolph v. 
Alabama” that “the imposition of the death penalty on a convicted rapist is ‘uncivilized 
conduct’ and constitutes cruel and inhuman punishment where he has neither taken nor 
endangered the life of his victim”). 
84  See infra Part II.B.1. 
85  Adams v. State, 271 N.E.2d 425, 431 (Ind. 1971), vacated by 284 N.E.2d 757 (Ind. 
1972) (DeBruler, J., concurring and dissenting in part); id. at 443 (Prentice, J., dissenting). 
86  Id. at 437–39 (DeBruler, J., dissenting). 
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high rate of executive commutations nationwide, the reluctance of juries to 
sentence people to death, and the reluctance of courts to affirm death 
sentences.87  “When the penalty is death, we [state supreme court justices], 
like state court judges, are tempted to strain the evidence and even, in close 
cases, the law in order to give a doubtfully condemned man another 
chance.”88  Finally, Justice Debruler relied on his own subjective judgment, 
noting the “extreme” psychological and physical pain endured by those 
executed as well as the death penalty’s unreliability and arbitrariness 
(disproportionately affecting the poor) as grounds for abolishing it.89 
In a separate dissenting opinion, Justice Dixon Prentice concluded that 
Indiana had already “abandoned capital punishment”; all that remained was 
for the court to abolish it.90 
[I]t is ludicrous and inhumane to any longer suspend those under sentence of death in a 
state of limbo, pending formal abolition . . . . We are the guardians of the rights of the 
most lowly among us, and for us to require them to await the miracle of legislative action 
in their behalf is an unwarranted passing of our responsibility to the Governor’s office 
or to higher judicial authority and is a denial of constitutional rights.91 
Less than one year later, in 1972, in People v. Anderson, California 
became the first state ever to judicially abolish its death penalty.92  In a 6–1 
decision holding the death penalty unconstitutional under the California 
Constitution, the Supreme Court of California noted the rarity of executions, 
the death penalty’s brutalizing psychological effects, and its repudiation by a 
number of states and many nations.93  The court also noted the death penalty’s 
 
87  Id.  
88  Id. at 439 (DeBruler, J., dissenting) (quoting Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 195 
(1953); see also Garvey, supra note 69, at 207 n.11 (“Until very recently, the New Jersey 
Supreme Court had reversed every death sentence on appeal.”). 
89  Adams, 271 N.E.2d at 441–42 (DeBruler, J., dissenting) (“[T]here are deficiencies in 
this legal machinery.  The most important of these is lack of money . . . . There are too few 
public defenders.  There are too few trial courts to handle the increasing caseload.  Too little 
money is being provided the indigent defendant for investigation, witness fees, all of which is 
necessary to providing a decent defense.  It is well documented that even when that machinery 
has done its job completely, miscarriages of justice occur.  The innocent do get convicted . . . . 
The risk of injustice is there, an ineradicable part of the exercise of human judgment.”). 
90  Id. at 444 (Prentice, J., dissenting). 
91  Id.; see id. at 443 (“[W]e courageously struck down certain outmoded and ill considered 
doctrines that had theretofore chained us to the past by the shackles of repetition . . . ”). 
92  People v. Anderson, 493 P.2d 880, 899 (Cal. 1972), superseded by constitutional 
amendment, CAL. CONST. art. I, § 27.  Later that year, the People of California amended the 
state constitution to permit the death penalty, and the legislature subsequently passed 
legislation reinstating the death penalty.  See People v. Frierson, 599 P.2d 587, 605 (Cal. 
1979). 
93  See Anderson, 493 P.2d at 894–95, 898–99.  The six Justices were: Donald Wright, 
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failure to deter crime, given lengthy delays between sentencing and execution 
and the arbitrariness inherent in the selection of those for death.94  And like 
Justice Goldberg, the Anderson court rejected “vengeance or retribution” as 
“incompatible with the dignity of an enlightened society.”95  According to 
the Anderson Court, the death penalty “degrades and dehumanizes all who 
participate in its processes” and is “incompatible with the dignity of man and 
the judicial process.”96 
Several months after the Anderson decision, in Furman v. Georgia, the 
Supreme Court famously struck down the death penalty as applied, holding 
that standardless jury sentencing violated the Eighth Amendment.97  
Significantly, Justices Thurgood Marshall and William Brennan went 
further.  In their concurring opinions, they argued that the death penalty was 
unconstitutional per se, relying on many of the same arguments raised by the 
Goldberg memorandum, the Indiana Justices, and the majority in Anderson.98  
Specifically, Justices Marshall and Brennan noted the death penalty’s 
rejection by contemporary society; the arbitrariness, unreliability, and mental 
pain inherent in the administration of the death penalty; and the death 
penalty’s failure to deter or deliver retribution, given the inefficiency and 
arbitrariness with which it is imposed.99  According to Justice Marshall, the 
death penalty was not only arbitrary but also discriminatory, with “the burden 
of capital punishment fall[ing] upon the poor, the ignorant, and the under 
privileged members of society.”100  And for Justice Brennan, dignity was 
central: “In comparison to all other punishments today, . . . the deliberate 
extinguishment of human life by the State is uniquely degrading to human 
dignity.”101 
The abolitionists’ victory was short-lived.  Just four years later, in 1976, 
in Gregg v. Georgia, the Supreme Court explicitly rejected Justice Marshall’s 
and Brennan’s position: the death penalty was not per se unconstitutional 
 
Raymond Peters, Mathew Tobriner, Stanley Mosk, Louis Burke, and Raymond Sullivan. 
94  Id. at 894–97. 
95  Id. at 896. 
96  Id. at 899. 
97  See 408 U.S. 238, 314 (1972) (White, J., concurring). 
98  See, e.g., id. at 305 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 370 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
99  See, e.g., id. at 288–306 (Brennan, J., concurring) (discussing death penalty’s severity, 
unreliability, arbitrariness, unacceptability, and lack of valid penological justification); see 
also id. at 342–69 (Marshall, J., concurring) (discussing death penalty’s lack of valid 
penological justification, unacceptability, discriminatory application, and unreliability). 
100  Id. at 365–66 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
101  Id. at 291 (Brennan, J., concurring); see also id. at 371 (Marshall, J., concurring) (“In 
recognizing the humanity of our fellow beings, we pay ourselves the highest tribute.”). 
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under the Eighth Amendment.102  Although the Supreme Court has repeated 
this refrain since 1976,103 a significant number of federal and state court 
judges have challenged this assumption.104 
2. Abolition Post-Gregg: 1977–1990 
In 1977, in Pierre v. Utah, Justice Richard Maughan of the Utah 
Supreme Court argued that the death penalty violates substantive due process 
under the federal and state constitutions because it deprives the “inherent and 
fundamental right” to life.105  According to Justice Maughan, the death 
penalty did not deter, as confirmed by abolition in a number of states with no 
associated rise in murders.106  The only compelling purpose that could 
possibly justify the death penalty, he concluded, would be restoring life.107  
“Were there some way to restore the bereaved and wounded survivors, and 
the victims, to what was once theirs[,]” he wrote, “there could then be 
justification for the capital sanction.  Sadly, such is not available to us.”108 
In 1980, in District Attorney v. Watson, the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts followed California’s lead in abolishing the death penalty.109  
In a 6–1 decision holding the death penalty unconstitutional under the 
Massachusetts Constitution, the court relied on the rarity of executions and 
the risk of error as evidence of the death penalty’s unacceptability, and also 
 
102  Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 186–87 (1976). 
103  See, e.g., Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2739 (2015) (citing cases). 
104  See infra Part II.B.2. 
105  572 P.2d 1338, 1359 (Utah 1977) (Maughan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
106  See id.  Justice Maughan rejected “vengeance” as a legitimate purpose, concluding that 
“[r]evenge is not a function of the law.”  Id.; cf. Provenzano v. Moore, 744 So. 2d 413, 446 
n.55 (Fla. 1999) (Anstead, J., dissenting) (“[I]t must never be said that the American justice 
system has refused to properly confront the issues that it has been given the unique 
responsibility to decide or, worse yet, that the justice system has allowed itself to become a 
means for extracting vengeance.”). 
107  Pierre, 572 P.2d at 1359 (Maughan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
108  Id. (Maughan, J., concurring and dissenting); see also Adams v. State, 271 N.E.2d 425, 
445 (Ind. 1971) (Prentice, J., dissenting) (noting the death penalty’s “finality and the fallibility 
of man,” and stating that “until we are more learned in the principles of resurrection or at least 
reincarnation, I cannot accept a sentence of death as consistent with principles of 
reformation”). 
109  411 N.E.2d 1274, 1286–87 (Mass. 1980). In 1982, the People of Massachusetts 
amended their state constitution to permit the death penalty, and the state legislature enacted 
a new death penalty statute.  In 1984, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court invalidated 
the statute—not on per se grounds, but instead because it “impermissibly burden[ed] both the 
right against self-incrimination and the right to a jury trial guaranteed by [the state 
constitution].”  See Com. v. Colon-Cruz, 470 N.E.2d 116, 117–18, 124 (Mass. 1984). 
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brought its own judgment to bear on the death penalty.110  Chief among the 
court’s reasons for abolishing the death penalty were arbitrariness, and racial 
bias specifically, in the administration of the death penalty.111  According to 
the court, “experience has shown that the death penalty will fall 
discriminatorily upon minorities, particularly blacks.”112  Human dignity, and 
the physical and mental pain inflicted on the condemned, also played a role 
in the court’s decision: 
There is little doubt that life is a fundamental right explicitly or implicitly guaranteed 
by the Constitution . . . . The calculated killing of a human being by the State involves, 
by its very nature, a denial of the executed person’s humanity.113 
In a concurring opinion, Justice Paul Liacos underscored the death 
penalty’s “physical and mental tortures” and its deprivation of human 
dignity.114  “The purpose of the cruel or unusual punishment prohibition is to 
guarantee a measure of human dignity even to the wrongdoers of our 
society,” he wrote.115  The death penalty was cruel and unusual because it 
deem[ed] the prisoner a nullity, less than human and unworthy to live . . . . My views 
would not change if stays on death row were made more pleasant, killing techniques 
less painful, or removal from death row more swift.  This is a punishment antithetical 
to the spiritual freedom that underlies the democratic mind. What dignity can remain 
for the government that countenances its use?116 
Over the next decade, four more state high court justices—in Tennessee, 
Wyoming, Washington, and Montana—similarly argued that the death 
penalty was per se unconstitutional.117  In 1981, in his concurring opinion in 
State v. Dicks, Chief Justice Ray Brock of the Tennessee Supreme Court 
argued in dissent that the death penalty violated the Tennessee 
Constitution.118  Relying heavily on the reasoning of the Supreme Judicial 
Court of Massachusetts in Watson and the Supreme Court of California in 
Anderson, the Chief Justice argued that the death penalty was unacceptable 
to contemporary society; served no legitimate purpose; and was “barbarous,” 
 
110  See Watson, 411 N.E.2d at 1282.  The six Justices were: Edward Hennessey, Robert 
Braucher, Benjamin Kaplan, Herbert Wilkins, Paul Liacos, and Ruth Abrams. 
111  Id. at 1283–86. 
112  Id. at 1283. 
113  Id. at 1282–83 (citation omitted). 
114  Id. at 1289, 1294 (Liacos, J., concurring). 
115  Id. at 1294 (Liacos, J., concurring). 
116  Id. at 1293–94 (Liacos, J., concurring). 
117  See infra notes 118–130. (discussing state high court decisions). 
118  State v. Dicks, 615 S.W.2d 126, 142 (Tenn. 1981) (Brock, C.J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
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arbitrary, and unreliable in its administration.119  Significantly, in reaching 
this conclusion, the Chief Justice acknowledged that he erred in supporting 
constitutionality of the death penalty in a concurring opinion just two years 
earlier: “But, I think it better to confess and correct that error than to 
perpetuate it.”120 
That same year, in Hopkinson v. State, Chief Justice Robert Rose of the 
Wyoming Supreme Court made nearly identical arguments in an opinion 
concurring and dissenting in part.121  The death penalty’s unacceptability to 
contemporary society, lack of penological purpose (including the 
illegitimacy of retribution as a goal of punishment), and infliction of physical 
and mental pain featured prominently in the Chief Justice’s conclusion that 
the death penalty violated the Wyoming Constitution.122  So, too, did the 
dignity of the condemned: 
It frightens me to hear it argued that, since the vilest and most depraved criminal has 
killed four people, the most civilized and humane response that the state of Wyoming 
can think of, in discharging its punishment obligations to society, is to kill the killer 
while pretending that the act of state murder is not offensive to her people’s sense of 
decency. 
I wonder how many capital victims would, if they could, tell us that the murders 
perpetrated upon them were not cruel—were not unusual—and therefore (within the 
ambit of these constitutional proscriptions) society could, so far as they were concerned, 
proceed to murder murderers.123 
In 1984, in his concurring opinion in State v. Rupe, Justice James 
Dolliver of the Washington Supreme Court cited Anderson in support of his 
conclusion that the death penalty violated the Washington Constitution.124  
 
119  Id. at 136–41.  
120  Id. at 133.  Chief Justice Brock also invoked dignity in support of his argument that 
the death penalty was unconstitutional.  See id. at 141–42 (“[C]apital punishment is . . . 
incompatible with the dignity of man and the judicial process.”) (quoting People v. Anderson, 
493 P.2d 880, 899 (Cal. 1972)). 
121  Hopkinson v. State, 632 P.2d 79, 199 (Wyo. 1981) (Rose, C.J., dissenting in part and 
concurring in part). 
122  See id. at 207–16. 
123  Id. at 199; see also id. at 215–16 (“I have lived my entire life in Wyoming and I have 
to believe that were my friends and associates who are citizens of this state able to visit the 
whole process of the death penalty from indictment to the throwing of the switch—with its 
dehumanizing effect—that is, its tendency to turn all of us who are charged with the 
responsibility of committing state murder back into animals—I am positive that the vast 
majority of the people of Wyoming would say . . . that there must be another way and that this 
form of punishment—while acceptable in another day—is no longer acceptable to a more 
advanced morality.”).  
124  State v. Rupe, 683 P.2d 571, 599 (Wash. 1984) (Dolliver, J., concurring). 
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Responding to the majority’s charge of judicial activism,125 Justice Dolliver 
stated that he was not substituting his moral judgments for those of the people 
of Washington; rather, he was deferring to those moral judgments as 
contained in the state constitution: 
If the meaning and application of our Bill of Rights, and the judgments contained 
therein, were fully revealed, there would be no need for this court to sit on cases 
involving our Bill of Rights as the popular will would always be manifest.  
Unfortunately, the constitutional language defies this easy escape for the judiciary.  
Thus, rather than decline to articulate the meaning of the constitution and its application, 
it is the duty of this court to express its understanding of the moral judgments rendered 
by the people in their constitution.126 
And in 1990, one year before his retirement, Justice John Sheehy of the 
Montana Supreme Court dissented in State v. Kills on Top, arguing that the 
death penalty was unconstitutional per se under the Montana Constitution.127  
Relying on Justice Brennan’s concurrence in Furman, Justice Sheehy 
supported his argument by pointing to the death penalty’s unacceptability to 
contemporary society—particularly given Montana’s lack of executions for 
over forty years with “no more than slight public reaction”—and the 
arbitrariness inherent in its administration.128  Like Chief Justice Brock of the 
Tennessee Supreme Court, Justice Sheehy came to the conclusion that the 
death penalty was unconstitutional after supporting its constitutionality for 
some time.129  Furthermore, like Justice Dolliver of the Washington Supreme 
Court, Justice Sheehy understood his decision to be motivated not by his 
personal moral views but rather by his interpretation of the state constitution: 
For a long time I have had the moral conviction that exacting the penalty of death in 
criminal cases was improper.  I have come to the legal conviction that the death penalty 
is indeed cruel and unusual punishment and so prohibited by the Eighth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution.130 
3. North, South, and the Federal Courts: 1994–2015 
The state with the most prolific, and also the most recent, history of 
 
125  Id.; see also id. at 592 (majority opinion) (“[W]e believe that to hold that the death 
penalty is per se unconstitutional would be to substitute our moral judgment for that of the 
people of Washington.”). 
126  Id. at 599 (Dolliver, J., concurring in the result). 
127  State v. Kills on Top, 787 P.2d 336, 356 (Mont. 1990) (Sheehy, J., dissenting). 
128  Id. at 356–57. 
129  Id. at 356 (stating that he had “authored two opinions affirming death penalties”). 
130  Id. at 355 (emphasis added); see also id. at 356 (stating that it is “the responsibility of 
judges to uphold the constitution and thus subordinate[] . . . moral feelings . . . and decide this 
type of case solely on . . . legal grounds”). 
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judicial opinions declaring the death penalty unconstitutional per se is 
Connecticut.  From 1994 to 2015, a total of seven Connecticut Supreme Court 
justices concluded that the death penalty violated the Connecticut 
Constitution.131 
In 1994, in State v. Ross, Justice Robert Berdon concluded that the death 
penalty was unconstitutional under the Connecticut Constitution based on 
arguments raised in Anderson and Watson, namely its 
 unacceptability to contemporary society, lack of a legitimate penological 
purpose, unreliability, arbitrary and racially discriminatory application, and 
barbarity—particularly given long delays between sentencing and 
execution.132  Citing Justice Brennan’s concurring opinion in Furman, Justice 
Berdon concluded that the death penalty was “a denial of a person’s basic 
humanity . . . . To burn human flesh to death by electrocution, or snuff out 
life through lethal injection, is not less inhumane because it is done in the 
name of justice.”133  Justice Berdon reiterated a number of these arguments—
particularly his argument that the death penalty was racially discriminatory—
in a series of subsequent dissenting opinions.134  “When a capital defendant 
marshals a compelling argument that the death penalty as it is administered 
in our state is incurably racist,” he wrote in State v. Cobb, “we should stop 
dead in our tracks until we have given the argument our most serious 
attention.”135 
In 2000, in her dissenting opinion in State v. Webb, Justice Joette Katz 
similarly concluded that the death penalty violated the Connecticut 
Constitution.136  Like those justices before her, Justice Katz regarded judicial 
abolition of the death penalty not as an affront to the separation of powers, 
but rather of a piece with it: 
[Judges] have a duty, as the final arbiters of the state constitution, to determine whether 
the punishment of death meets contemporary and moral standards of decency.  If a 
penalty exceeds those bounds, as I believe the death penalty does, we have a 
 
131  See infra notes 132–139, 153–156, 173–183, and accompanying text (discussing 
opinions of Justices Berdon, Katz, Harper, Norcott, Palmer, Eveleigh, and McDonald).  
132  State v. Ross, 646 A.2d 1318, 1378–88 (Conn. 1994) (Berdon, J., dissenting). 
133  Id. at 1380.  
134  See, e.g., State v. Cobb, 743 A.2d 1, 137–42 (Conn. 1999) (Berdon, J., dissenting); 
State v. Webb, 680 A.2d 147, 229-31 (Conn. 1996) (Berdon, J., dissenting) [hereinafter Webb 
I]; State v. Breton, 663 A.2d 1026, 1054–55 (Conn. 1995) (Berdon, J., dissenting); see also 
State v. Griffin, 741 A.2d 913, 952 (Conn. 1999) (Berdon, J., dissenting) (“[T]he penalty of 
death fails to comport with contemporary standards of decency and . . . constitutes cruel and 
unusual punishment in violation of our state constitution.”). 
135  Cobb, 743 A.2d at 140–41 (Berdon, J., dissenting). 
136  State v. Webb, 750 A.2d 448, 458 (Conn. 2000) (Katz, J., dissenting). 
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constitutional obligation to declare it unconstitutional, just as we would if the legislature 
provided for punishment by the rack, the screw or the wheel. 
. . . [W]hether carried out by impalement or electrocution, crucifixion or the gas 
chamber, firing squad or hanging, lethal injection or some other method yet to be 
designed, the very quintessence of capital punishment is cruelty.137 
In a subsequent dissent in a different death penalty case, Justice Katz 
pointed to arbitrariness and racial discrimination as additional reasons for 
opposing the death penalty per se.138  “[E]ven under the most sophisticated 
death penalty statutes, race continues to play a major role.  We have not 
eliminated the biases and prejudices that infect society generally . . . .”139 
In contrast to the slow but steady drumbeat of state supreme court 
opinions opposing the death penalty post-Gregg, the federal judiciary was 
largely silent, save for the repeated dissents of Justices Brennan and 
Marshall.140  This changed in 1994, when Justice Harry Blackmun, who had 
voted to uphold the death penalty in Gregg, uttered his now famous words in 
an opinion dissenting from a denial of certiorari in Callins v. Collins: “From 
this day forward, I no longer shall tinker with the machinery of death.”141  
Arbitrariness, discrimination, and unreliability, he reasoned, were 
inescapable parts of that machinery; indeed, twenty years’ worth of effort to 
remedy them had proven futile.142  The death penalty—the “killing [of] 
human beings”—Justice Blackmun concluded, “cannot be administered in 
accord with our Constitution.”143 
In 2002, federal district court Judge Jed Rakoff held that, given “the 
unacceptably high rate at which innocent persons are convicted of capital 
crimes” and the “prolonged delays before such errors are detected,” the 
 
137  Id. at 459 (quoting Justice Berdon’s dissenting opinion in Webb I).  “[S]ociety should 
not have the authority to sustain an institution the nature of which is to destroy its own 
members.  If our status as moral creatures is to survive, the termination of our ability to 
accomplish a deliberate institutionalized method of execution heads my list of desiderata for 
this society.”  Id. at 459–60. 
138  State v. Peeler, 857 A.2d 808, 888 (Conn. 2004) (Katz, J., dissenting). 
139  Id. 
140  Justices Brennan and Marshall dissented in Gregg and in every death penalty case that 
followed it—more than 2,100 cases, according to one commentator.  Michael Mello, Adhering 
to Our Views: Justices Brennan and Marshall and the Relentless Dissent to Death as a 
Punishment, 22 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 591, 593 (1995). 
141  Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
142  Id. at 1143–59. “The problem is that the inevitability of factual, legal, and moral error 
gives us a system that we know must wrongly kill some defendants, a system that fails to 
deliver the fair, consistent, and reliable sentences of death required by the Constitution.”  Id. 
at 1145–46. 
143  Id. at 1143, 1157.  
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federal death penalty statute violated due process by depriving innocent 
people of the right to prove their innocence.144  Although Judge Rakoff’s 
decision stopped short of holding the death penalty unconstitutional per se, 
this was the effect of his decision, for no criminal justice scheme is 
infallible.145  Not surprisingly, the Second Circuit reversed the decision, 
holding that “there is no fundamental right to a continued opportunity for 
exoneration throughout the course of one’s natural life.”146 
In 2008, Justice John Paul Stevens who, like Justice Blackmun, had 
voted to uphold the death penalty in Gregg, registered his opposition to the 
death penalty.147  Relying on over thirty years of “almost daily exposure to 
the facts and circumstances of hundreds and hundreds of federal and state 
criminal cases involving crimes for which death is the authorized penalty,” 
Justice Stevens concluded that the death penalty was “patently excessive and 
cruel and unusual punishment violative of the Eighth Amendment.”148  The 
death penalty served no penological purpose, he argued, and was plagued by 
arbitrariness and an “unacceptable” risk of racial discrimination and error.149 
On the heels of Justice Stevens’s opinion in Baze v. Rees, Mississippi 
Supreme Court Justice Oliver E. Diaz, Jr., joined by Justice James E. Graves, 
Jr., argued that the death penalty violated the federal and state 
constitutions.150  “I am convinced that the progress of our maturing society,” 
Justice Diaz stated, “is pointed toward a day when our nation and state 
recognize that, even as murderers commit the most cruel and unusual crime, 
so too do executioners render cruel and unusual punishment . . . . I would 
 
144  United States v. Quinones, 205 F. Supp. 2d 256, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), rev’d, 313 F.3d 
49 (2d Cir. 2002); see also id. at 264 (“What DNA testing has proved, beyond cavil, is the 
remarkable degree of fallibility in the basic fact-finding processes on which we rely in criminal 
cases.”); cf. Thompson v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 918, 937 (9th Cir. 1998), as amended (July 13, 
1998) (Reinhardt, J., concurring and dissenting in part) (dissenting from majority’s refusal to 
allow defendant to file a petition for writ of habeas corpus raising actual innocence claim, 
characterizing the denial as a “miscarriage of justice” and “the product of the federal 
judiciary’s elevation of procedure over justice, of speed and efficiency over fairness and due 
process”). 
145  See United States v. Quinones, 313 F.3d 49, 65 (2d Cir. 2002) (“[O]ur judicial 
system—indeed, any judicial system—is fallible . . . .”); cf. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 
279, 315 n.37 (1987) (“[T]he dissent’s call for greater rationality is no less than a claim that a 
capital punishment system cannot be administered in accord with the Constitution.”). 
146  Quinones, 313 F.3d at 52. 
147  Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 86 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). 
148  Id. at 83, 86 (quoting Justice White’s concurring opinion in Furman). 
149  Id. at 78–86.  
150  Doss v. State, NO. 2007-CA-00429-SCT, at 28 (Miss. Dec. 11, 2008) (Diaz, J., 
dissenting), available at https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/files/pdf/DossvMississippi.pdf. 
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make today that day.”151 
In reaching this conclusion, Justice Diaz traced the death penalty’s 
familiar litany of failings, namely: “inherent” arbitrariness; “wholly 
inadequate” indigent defense; “[t]he specter of racially motivated 
executions,” particularly given that African Americans comprise more than 
half of Mississippi’s death row but constitute only one-third of Mississippi’s 
population; unreliability, with exonerations “leav[ing] little room for doubt  
that innocent men, at unknown and terrible moments in our history, have 
gone unexonerated and been sent baselessly to their deaths”; objective indicia 
of unacceptability, both statewide and nationally; and a lack of penological 
purpose, with deterrence unproven and retribution illegitimate.152 
In 2012, in State v. Santiago (Santiago I), Connecticut Supreme Court 
Justice Lubbie Harper, Jr. added his opposition to the death penalty under the 
Connecticut Constitution, focusing on the themes of unacceptability; a lack 
of legitimate penological purpose, particularly given “the anguish attendant 
to capital punishment’s performance of its irrevocable function”; and 
arbitrariness, racial discrimination, and unreliability inherent in the death 
penalty’s administration.153  Justice Harper’s critique of the death penalty’s 
“racially skewed imposition” was pointed: 
The constitution and the standards of our society cannot possibly countenance ending a 
human life for racist reasons . . . . I take it as a matter too obvious to discuss that our 
state’s constitution could not, in the twenty-first century, permit a hateful and vengeful 
system that takes the lives of predominantly black men generally accused of crimes 
against whites.  The parallels to a prior, equally untenable system of “justice” that once 
prevailed in much of this country are all too clear.  While significant social progress has 
been made since those days, the continued exercise of a racially charged system of 
extermination, coupled with the disparate treatment even of victims based on their race, 
is yet another reminder that our society’s long path toward equality is far from complete.  
There is no better next step than the rejection of a system that is, in reality, little more 
than the heir to lynch mobs.154 
Human dignity was also central to his critique.  “[T]he categorical 
exclusion of any person from humanity cannot be reconciled with a 
legitimate vision of human dignity,” he wrote.155  “It is a reality, albeit a 
difficult one, that even a person who commits the most heinous and 
 
151  Id. at 37. 
152  Id. at 29–37. 
153  State v. Santiago, 49 A.3d 566, 694–705 (Conn. 2012) (Harper, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) [hereinafter Santiago I], judgment set aside, opinion not vacated (Aug. 
25, 2015), opinion supplemented on reconsideration, 122 A.3d 1 (Conn. 2015). 
154  Id. at 702, 705 & n.15.  
155  Id. at 697.  
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unforgivable acts is still one of us—a member of the human community and 
of our society.”156 
In 2014, after four decades on the bench, Judge Tom Price of the Texas 
Court of Criminal Appeals, Texas’ highest court for criminal appeals, called 
for an end to the death penalty in his dissenting opinion in Ex parte Panetti.157  
Characterizing judges as “guardians of the process,” he concluded that the 
death penalty process was inherently flawed and “should be abolished.”158  
According to Judge Price, “societal values” supported abolition, as indicated 
by a reduction in death penalty prosecutions and death sentences.159  In 
addition, 
the execution of individuals does not appear to measurably advance the retribution and 
deterrence purposes served by the death penalty; the life without parole option 
adequately protects society at large in the same way as the death penalty punishment 
option; and the risk of executing an innocent person for a capital murder is unreasonably 
high, particularly in light of procedural-default laws and the prevalence of ineffective 
trial and initial habeas counsel.160 
In 2015, in Glossip v. Gross, Justice Stephen Breyer, joined by Justice 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, argued in dissent that it was “highly likely that the 
death penalty violates the Eighth Amendment” and invited full briefing on 
the issue.161  According to Justice Breyer: 
In 1976, the Court thought that the constitutional infirmities in the death penalty could 
be healed; the Court in effect delegated significant responsibility to the States to develop 
procedures that would protect against those constitutional problems.  Almost 40 years 
of studies, surveys, and experience strongly indicate, however, that this effort has 
failed.162 
Four considerations led Justice Breyer to question the death penalty’s 
constitutionality.  The first consideration was the death penalty’s lack of 
reliability, especially given the high number of exonerations in capital 
cases.163  Second was the death penalty’s arbitrariness, with death sentences 
largely determined by race, gender, local geography, and resources, as 
opposed to the egregiousness of the crime.164  Third was the extraordinary 
 
156  Id. at 705.  
157  Ex parte Panetti, 450 S.W.3d 144, 145 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (Price, J., dissenting). 
158  Id. at 147. 
159  Id. at 145. 
160  Id. at 147. 
161  Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2776–77 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
162  Id. at 2755.  
163  Id. at 2256–59. 
164  Id. at 2259–64. 
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delay between sentence and execution, which aggravates the death penalty’s 
cruelty and diminishes its legitimate penological goals.165  And the final 
consideration was the rarity with which the death penalty is carried out.166 
Responding to Justice Breyer’s dissent, Justices Clarence Thomas and 
Antonin Scalia argued that judicial abolition would mark the culmination of 
the Court’s “ceaseless quest to end the death penalty through undemocratic 
means,”167 “replac[ing] the judgments of the People with [the Court’s] own 
standards of decency.”168  Justice Breyer acknowledged this “strong 
counterargument.”169  Over forty years ago, in Furman, he explained that the 
Court did look to the People—to Congress and state legislatures—to fix 
many of the very problems he had identified.170  And the legislatures 
responded.171  But, he concluded: 
[I]n the last four decades, considerable evidence has accumulated that those responses 
have not worked. Thus we are left with a judicial responsibility. The Eighth 
Amendment sets forth the relevant law, and we must interpret that law.172  
Just weeks later, in State v. Santiago (Santiago II), the Connecticut 
Supreme Court became the third state supreme court in history to abolish the 
death penalty.173  In a 4–3 decision, the court ruled that the death penalty was 
cruel and unusual in violation of the Connecticut Constitution.174  One year 
later, in May 2016, a newly reconstituted court upheld that decision 5–2.175 
The majority’s reasons in Santiago II for abolishing the death penalty 
were familiar ones, neatly packaged into two parts.176  First, the court 
concluded that the death penalty was unacceptable to contemporary society, 
 
165  Id. at 2264–72. 
166  Id. at 2772–76.  
167  Id. at 2755 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
168  Id. at 2749 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
169  Id. at 2776 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
170  Id. 
171  Id. (“We are a court.  Why should we not leave the matter up to the people acting 
democratically through legislatures?”). 
172  Id. (emphasis added). 
173  State v. Santiago, 122 A.3d 1, 10 (Conn. 2015) [hereinafter Santiago II]. 
174  Id.  The four Justices were: Flemming Norcott, Richard Palmer, Dennis Eveleigh, and 
Andrew McDonald. 
175  State v. Peeler, 140 A.3d 811 (Conn. 2016).  Citing respect for “the basic principle of 
stare decisis,” Chief Justice Chase Rogers, who dissented in Santiago II, joined Justices 
Palmer, Eveleigh, and McDonald in upholding abolition of the death penalty in Peeler.  Id. at 
813 (Rogers, C.J., concurring).  Justice Norcott, who voted with the majority in Santiago II, 
retired from the court and was replaced by Justice Robinson, who provided a fifth vote to 
uphold the death penalty in Peeler.  Id. at 833 (Robinson, J., concurring). 
176  Santiago II, 122 A.3d 31–73. 
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based on objective criteria that included a rarity of executions and 
Connecticut’s 2012 partial repeal of the death penalty (for future crimes 
only).177  Second, the court concluded that the death penalty lacked a 
legitimate penological purpose, given its inherent inefficiency, unreliability, 
arbitrariness, and “inescapabl[e] taint[]” of “caprice and bias.”178  In response 
to a stinging dissent by Chief Justice Chase Rogers that accused the majority 
of “relying solely on its own views” and invalidating the death penalty 
because “it offends the majority’s subjective sense of morality,”179 the 
Justices in the majority shot back: 
[W]e do not question the sincerity or good faith of Chief Justice Rogers’ views, and we 
find it unfortunate that she deems it necessary to question ours.  Although it should go 
without saying, we feel compelled to emphasize that we, no less than the dissenting 
justices, have decided this case on the basis of our understanding of and dedication to 
the governing legal principles, and our decision should in no way be taken as an 
indication of our personal views with respect to the morality of capital punishment.180 
Justice Flemming Norcott, a staunch critic of Connecticut’s death 
penalty for over two decades,181 together with the newly appointed Justice 
Andrew McDonald, authored a joint concurrence addressing persistent 
allegations of racial and ethnic discrimination in the administration of the 
death penalty.182  “In light of th[e] historical and statistical record,” they 
wrote, “we would be hard-pressed to dismiss or explain away the abundant 
evidence that suggests the death penalty in Connecticut, as elsewhere, has 
been and continues to be imposed disproportionately on racial and ethnic 
minorities.”183 
 
177  Id. at 35–55. 
178  Id. at 55–73. 
179  Id. at 159–60 n.33, 164 (Rogers, C.J., dissenting). 
180  Id. at 55 n.89 (majority opinion). 
181  State v. Cobb, 743 A.2d 1, 143–48 (Conn. 1999) (Norcott, J., dissenting); id. at 146 
(“[T]he reality is that a large part of the death row population is made up of people who are 
distinguished by neither their records, nor the circumstances of their crimes, but by their abject 
poverty, debilitating mental impairments, minimal intelligence, and the poor legal 
representation they received.”); State v. Webb, 680 A.2d 147, 237 (Conn. 1996) (Norcott, J., 
dissenting) (“As long as racial prejudice is a factor in our lives, and it is an undeniable factor 
in every facet of American life, there can be no place for a capital penalty in our society.”). 
182  Santiago II, 122 A.3d at 85–100 (Norcott and McDonald, Js., concurring). 
183  Id. at 96.  Justice Eveleigh wrote a separate concurring opinion, arguing that not only 
Connecticut’s death penalty, but also Connecticut’s partial repeal of the death penalty for 
future crimes only, violated the federal and state constitutions.  Id. at 103 (Eveleigh, J., 
concurring). 
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4. Honorable Mention 
Several other judges deserve mention.  While stopping short of either 
abolishing the death penalty per se or calling for its abolition, each has 
expressed grave doubts about whether the death penalty can ever be imposed 
as a sanction for murder.184 
In 1975, holding that Massachusetts’ mandatory death penalty for rape-
murder deprived “the fundamental constitutional right to life” in violation of 
the Massachusetts Constitution, Chief Justice G. Joseph Tauro of the 
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts implied that a discretionary death 
penalty would also violate the right to life.185 
Dissenting from a denial of post-conviction relief in a 1981 death 
penalty case, Justice Daniel Shea of the Montana Supreme Court chided the 
majority for “clos[ing] its eyes to the issues raised on appeal.”186  According 
to Justice Shea, the federal and state constitutions required an evidentiary 
hearing to determine whether Montana’s death penalty served any valid state 
purpose in light of its arbitrary and discriminatory imposition, the rarity of 
executions, and the undue delay between sentencing and execution.187  
“Never in the annals of criminal law history in this State,” he wrote, “has a 
defendant ever been the victim of such a consistent and wholesale denial of 
fundamental rights.”188 
In a 1987 dissenting opinion concluding that New Jersey’s death penalty 
statute was cruel and unusual as well as a violation of due process and 
“fundamental fairness” under the state constitution, New Jersey Supreme 
Court Justice Alan Handler stated that: 
[T]ime will settle the question [of whether the death penalty is unconstitutional per se].  
All of us will, I am certain, endure the frustrating and frenetic attempts to enforce capital 
punishment in a fair and sensible way that now plague our sister states.  That experience 
will, I fear, yield grim confirmation of the fact that capital punishment in a civilized 
constitutional society is virtually impossible to administer in a principled manner.  The 
 
184  See infra notes 185–215 and accompanying text. 
185  See Com. v. O’Neal, 339 N.E.2d 676, 688 (Mass. 1975); see also id. at 683, 688 n.23 
(stating that “if [a discretionary death penalty] should be enacted, the burden would be on the 
Commonwealth to establish that such use of the death penalty is the least restrictive means for 
furtherance of a compelling State interest,” and implying that evidence supporting the 
deterrent effect of a discretionary death penalty was weaker than evidence supporting 
mandatory death penalty). 
186  McKenzie v. Osborne, 640 P.2d 368, 384 (Mont. 1981) (Shea, J., dissenting). 
187  Id. at 429–32. 
188  Id. at 434 (“[M]y review of this appeal has convinced me beyond any doubt that a 
defendant sentenced to death in this state has no chance to obtain fair, adequate, and 
meaningful review.”). 
BARRY 10/10/17  5:42 PM 
552 BARRY [Vol. 107 
 
per se invalidity of official capital punishment, in other words, may well be self-
revealing.189 
Justice Handler chronicled this revelation in a long series of sharply-
worded, voluminous dissents that took aim at the death penalty’s arbitrariness 
and “impermissible risk of racial discrimination” that “single[d] out black 
persons for death.”190 
In 1988, Justice Hans Linde of the Oregon Supreme Court suggested 
that every death penalty scheme raises concerns of arbitrariness—namely, 
the “prosecution[] of similar offenders committing similar crimes, of whom 
some are selected for the death penalty and others are not”—in violation of 
the state constitution.191 
In 1989, Justice Robert Glass of the Connecticut Supreme Court 
expressed “serious doubts as to the viability of [the U.S. Supreme Court’s] 
death penalty standard that only provides that the sentencer’s ‘discretion must 
be suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary 
and capricious action.’”192  According to Justice Glass, the Connecticut 
Constitution, by contrast, did not appear to tolerate any “capriciousness in 
the application of the death penalty.”193 
In 1998, in People v. Bull, Justice Moses Harrison II wrote a sharply-
worded dissent that called for an end to Illinois’ death penalty based largely 
on the exoneration of nine Illinois death row inmates in as many years.194  
Justice Harrison did not mince words: “Innocent persons are going to be 
 
189  State v. Ramseur, 524 A.2d 188, 321 (N.J. 1987) (Handler, J., dissenting); see also id. 
at 365 (“Because of the primacy our society reposes, as against the state, in individual life, . . . 
no other issue so demands that legal doctrine be coherent and just. . . . As guardians of the 
Constitution that embodies that value and that commitment [to the sanctity of individual 
life], . . . the Court must never suffer state actions to replicate even remotely the irrationality 
of [the defendant].  Were the state to do so through the unreasoned imposition of death it would 
be traducing individual life, not honoring it.”). 
190  State v. Loftin, 724 A.2d 129, 191 (N.J. 1999) (Handler, J., dissenting); see, e.g., State 
v. Bey, 645 A.2d 685, 733 (N.J. 1994) (Handler, J., dissenting); State v. DiFrisco, 662 A.2d 
442, 491 (N.J. 1995) (Handler, J., dissenting); State v. Marshall, 613 A.2d 1059, 1143 (N.J. 
1992) (Handler, J., dissenting); State v. Martini, 651 A.2d 949, 1001 (N.J. 1994) (Handler, J., 
dissenting);  
191  State v. Wagner, 752 P.2d 1136, 1196–97, 1197 n.7, 1199 (Or. 1988) (Linde, J., 
dissenting), cert. granted, vacated on other grounds, 492 U.S. 914 (1989). 
192  State v. Breton, 562 A.2d 1060, 1071 (Conn. 1989) (Glass, J., dissenting) (quoting 
Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 427 (1980)). 
193  Id. 
194  People v. Bull, 705 N.E.2d 824, 847 (Ill. 1998) (Harrison, J., dissenting) (discussing 
nine exonerations between 1987 and 1996).  Justice Harrison also pointed to the weight of 
international opinion against the death penalty, as well as abolition among twelve U.S. states 
and the District of Columbia.  Id. at 846. 
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sentenced to death” and would “inevitably . . . be executed in Illinois” in 
violation of the federal and state constitutions.195 
Characterizing this line of argument as an “inexplicable attack” on 
fundamental principles and a “strident protest . . . against the concept of the 
Anglo–American criminal trial itself,” the majority’s response was, in effect, 
to let the defendant eat cake.196  “Have mistakes been made?  Will mistakes 
be made?  Certainly,” said the court.197  But since the “defendant does not 
suggest a substitute for this system,” the “inevitable execution of innocent 
persons” was not the court’s problem.198  The majority opinion, and a separate 
concurrence authored by three Justices in the majority, rebuked Justice 
Harrison for “elevat[ing] personal beliefs above thoughtful constitutional 
analysis,” abandoning “[j]udicial restraint and deference to legislative 
judgments,” and “impugn[ing] the integrity of other members of the court.”199  
Undeterred, Justice Harrison reflected: 
Just as the execution of an innocent person is inevitable, it is inevitable that one day the 
majority will no longer be able to deny that the Illinois death penalty scheme, as 
presently administered, is profoundly unjust.  When that day comes, as it must, my 
colleagues will see what they have allowed to happen, and they will feel ashamed.200 
In 2005, in Moore v. Parker, Judge Boyce F. Martin, Jr. of the Sixth 
Circuit enumerated various criticisms of the death penalty, including 
unreliability, “blatant racial prejudice,” “incomprehensible arbitrariness,” 
“bad lawyering,” pro-death penalty bias among juries and elected judges, and 
U.S. exceptionalism among western democracies.201  Acknowledging his 
“oath . . . to apply the law as interpreted by the Supreme Court of the United 
States,”202 Judge Martin declined to declare the death penalty 
unconstitutional, but forcefully argued that it was: 
arbitrary, biased, and so fundamentally flawed at its very core that it is beyond 
repair. . . . Death has more to do with extra-judicial factors like race and socio-economic 
status than with whether death is deserved.  A system, whose basic justification is the 
interest in retribution and general deterrence, is not served when guided by such 
 
195  Id. at 847–48. 
196  Id. at 841 (majority opinion). 
197  Id. at 842. 
198  Id. at 840–42. 
199  Id. at 844; id. at 845 (Miller, J., concurring). 
200  Id. at 848 (Harrison, J., dissenting). 
201  Moore v. Parker, 425 F.3d 250, 268–69 (6th Cir. 2005) (Martin, J., dissenting). 
202  Id. at 270 (“I have no delusions of grandeur and I know my place in the judiciary . . . . 
I will continue to do as I am told until the Supreme Court concludes that the death penalty 
cannot be administered in a constitutional manner or our legislatures abolish the penalty.”). 
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irrelevant factors.  Nor should a system of life and death hinge on the proficiency of 
counsel.203 
Reflecting on his over twenty-five years on the bench, Judge Martin 
concluded that “the idea that the death penalty is fairly and rationally imposed 
in this country is a farce.”204 
Less than six months later, Washington Supreme Court Justice Charles 
W. Johnson, joined by Justices Richard B. Sanders, Susan Owens, and 
Barbara Madsen, similarly argued in dissent that Washington’s death penalty 
was “arbitrarily or capriciously” imposed in violation of Furman.205  Pointing 
to life sentences received by three of “the worst mass murderers in 
Washington’s history,” who were collectively responsible for killing 
seventy-four people, Justice Johnson concluded that the “death penalty is like 
lightening . . . . No rational explanation exists to explain why some 
individuals escape the penalty of death and others do not.”206  While stopping 
short of finding the death penalty unconstitutional per se, Justice Johnson’s 
opinion strongly implied that “the arbitrariness with which the penalty of 
death is exacted” was incapable of remedy.207 
More recently, in 2014, federal district court Judge Cormac Carney held 
that the extraordinary, decades-long delay that precedes execution in 
California rendered its death penalty arbitrary and devoid of penological 
purpose in violation of the Eighth Amendment.208  Although Judge Carney 
did not reach whether California’s death penalty was per se 
unconstitutional,209 his opinion suggested that California’s death penalty 
could not be rationally carried out, given the inherent tension between 
efficiency and accuracy.210 
In March 2016, in holding that Alabama’s death penalty procedures 
violated the defendants’ Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial in light of 
 
203  Id. at 268, 270. 
204  Id.  
205  State v. Cross, 132 P.3d 80, 114 (Wash. 2006) (Johnson, J., dissenting). 
206  Id. at 112–15. 
207  Id. at 109, 115 (discussing “serious flaws” in Washington’s death penalty system). 
208  Jones v. Chappell, 31 F. Supp. 3d 1050, 1061, 1063 (C.D. Cal. 2014), rev’d sub nom. 
on other grounds, Jones v. Davis, 806 F.3d 538 (9th Cir. 2015). 
209  Id. at 1061 (acknowledging that “reasonable people may debate whether the death 
penalty offends th[e Constitution’s] proscription” of cruel and unusual punishment). 
210  Compare id. at 1062 (“[T]o carry out the sentences of the 748 inmates currently on 
[California’s] Death Row, the State would have to conduct more than one execution a week 
for the next 14 years.”), with id. at 1067 (“Of course, the Court’s conclusion should not be 
understood to suggest that the post-conviction review process should be curtailed in favor of 
speed over accuracy.”). 
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Hurst v. Florida,211 state trial court Judge Tracie Todd offered a harsh critique 
of Alabama’s administration of the death penalty more generally.212  Pointing 
to bias in the elected judiciary, unqualified defense counsel, and inadequate 
funding of the judicial branch, Judge Todd concluded: 
There is a time and place for diplomacy and subtlety.  That time and place has been 
expunged by the dire state of the justice system in Alabama.  It is clear, from here on 
the front line, that Alabama’s judiciary has unequivocally been hijacked by partisan 
interests and unlawful legislative neglect . . . . As a result, the death penalty in Alabama 
is being imposed in a “wholly arbitrary and capricious” manner.213 
And in December 2016, after conducting a two-week evidentiary 
hearing on the constitutionality of the Federal Death Penalty Act, federal 
district court judge Geoffrey Crawford concluded that the Act 
falls short of the standard required in Furman v. Georgia and in Gregg for identifying 
defendants who meet objective criteria for imposition of the death penalty.  Like the 
state statutes enacted after Furman, the [Act] operates in an arbitrary manner in which 
chance and bias play leading roles.214 
Conceding that “Gregg is still the law of the land,” Judge Crawford 
denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss the death penalty, but stated that 
“[t]he time has surely arrived to recognize that the reforms introduced by 
Gregg and subsequent decisions have largely failed to remedy the problems 
 
211  Alabama v. Billups et. al., CC-2005-001755.00, Mar. 3, 2016, at 26–27, available at 
http://media.al.com/news_birmingham_impact/other/Hurst%20-%20FINAL.pdf, vacated by 
Ex Parte State, No. CR-15-0619, 2016 WL 3364689, at *1 (Ala. Crim. App. June 17, 2016).  
In Hurst, the U.S. Supreme Court held that Florida’s death penalty statute violated the 
defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial because it required a judge, not a jury, to 
find facts necessary to warrant a sentence of death.  Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616, 619 
(2016).  According to the trial court in Billups, Alabama’s death penalty procedures violated 
Hurst by “[a]llowing a judge to consider information not known to the jury and override the 
jury’s determination.”  Billups at 26.  On a petition for writ of mandamus, Alabama’s Court 
of Criminal Appeals disagreed, holding that Alabama’s death penalty procedures do not 
violate the holding of Hurst and ordering the trial court to set aside its order holding the death 
penalty unconstitutional.  Ex parte State, 2016 WL 3364689, at *11; accord. In re Bohannon 
v. State, No. 1150640, 2016 WL 5817692, at *5 (Ala. Sept. 30, 2016), cert. denied sub nom. 
Bohannon v. Alabama, 137 S. Ct. 831 (2017). 
212  Billups, supra note 211, at 5–11; see also Ex Parte State, 2016 WL 3364689, at *16 
(Burke, J., concurring) (questioning “whether the trial court’s ultimate conclusion is based on 
its analysis of Hurst or on the trial judge’s personal opinions regarding Alabama’s death 
penalty,” and noting that “[t]he majority of the order is devoted to the trial court’s opinions 
regarding partisan politics, the effects of an elected judiciary, court funding, and the propriety 
of the death penalty in general”). 
213  Billups, supra note 211, at 1, 27. 
214  United States v. Fell, No. 5:01–cr–12–01, 2016 WL 7238930, at *1 (D. Vt. Dec. 13, 
2016). 
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identified in Furman.”215 
III. THE RIGHT SIDE OF HISTORY 
Is the death penalty acceptable to contemporary society?  Is it defensible 
as a matter of deterrence or retribution?  Is the death penalty consistent with 
human dignity?  Eventually, the U.S. Supreme Court will follow the path laid 
down by federal and state judges for the past half-century and answer each 
of these questions in the negative.216 
This, in turn, gives rise to perhaps the most salient question of all: even 
if the death penalty is unacceptable, devoid of penological purpose, and a 
violation of dignity, should the U.S. Supreme Court be the one to get rid of 
it?  Will doing so be the culmination of the U.S. Supreme Court’s dignity 
jurisprudence—a rejection of American exceptionalism on the world stage 
and a ringing endorsement of the most universal dignity, the right to life 
itself?217  Or will it instead represent a stunning blow to our democracy—a 
rejection of judicial self-restraint akin to Lochner v. New York.218  Will 
judicial abolition make us “the Nation we aspire to be,”219 or a nation that has 
lost its way? 
The right side of history, or the wrong side? 
For an answer to that question, one might look to the example of slavery.  
The U.S. Supreme Court did not abolish slavery or even seriously question 
its constitutionality.220  It certainly could have.  In 1771, in his charge to a 
grand jury at a session of the North Carolina Superior Court, colonial judge 
Martin Howard remarked on the inconsistency between the institution of 
slavery and the idea that “all men are by nature equal and by nature free.”221  
 
215  Id. at *28. 
216  See supra Parts I and II. 
217  See supra notes 26–36 and accompanying text (discussing worldwide evolution away 
from death penalty and also the Supreme Court’s reliance on dignity in Eighth Amendment 
context). 
218  See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2612 (2015) (“It can be tempting for judges 
to confuse our own preferences with the requirements of the law. But as this Court has been 
reminded throughout our history, the Constitution ‘is made for people of fundamentally 
differing views.’”) (quoting Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., 
dissenting)). 
219  Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1992 (2014). 
220  ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 708–09 (4th 
ed. 2011). 
221  GENTLEMEN OF THE GRAND JURY: THE SURVIVING GRAND JURY CHARGES FROM 
COLONIAL, STATE, AND LOWER FEDERAL COURTS BEFORE 1801, 708 (Stanton D. Krauss ed., 
2012). 
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Slavery, he argued, 
is an adventitious, not a natural state.  The souls and bodies of negroes are of the same 
quality with ours—they are our fellow creatures, tho’ in humbler circumstances, and 
are capable of the same happiness and misery with us. . . . I am content it should be 
said, that these observations proceed more from the heart than the understanding, at the 
same time I shall ever suspect the soundness of that understanding which has no mixture 
of humanity.222 
Similarly, in 1783, in his instructions to a jury in a case involving the 
beating of an enslaved man, Chief Justice William Cushing of the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court concluded that slavery was at odds 
with the Massachusetts Constitution’s declaration “that all men are born free 
and equal.”223  According to Cushing: 
[W]hatever sentiments have formerly prevailed in this particular or slid in upon us by 
the example of others, a different idea has taken place with the people of America, more 
favorable to the natural rights of mankind, and to that natural, innate desire of Liberty, 
with which Heaven (without regard to color, complexion, or shape of noses—features) 
has inspired all the human race.224 
Instead of following the lead of these judges, the Supreme Court in Dred 
Scott v. Sandford did precisely the opposite, invalidating a federal law that 
would have restricted the expansion of slavery and thus fortifying slavery’s 
hold on the Nation.225 
History has not been kind to slavery.  Between 1865 and 1867, historian, 
congressman, newspaper editor, and antislavery advocate Horace Greeley 
published The American Conflict, a 1400-page, two-volume treatise on the 
abolition of slavery.226  It is a harsh indictment of the institution.227 
 
222  Id. at 709. 
223  Steven G. Calabresi & Sofía M. Vickery, On Liberty and the Fourteenth Amendment: 
The Original Understanding of the Lockean Natural Rights Guarantees, 93 TEX. L. REV. 1299, 
1331 (2015) (discussing Quock Walker cases). 
224  Id. (quoting Document 15: Commonwealth v. Jennison, Charge of Chief Justice 
Cushing, in CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE AMERICAN NEGRO: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 45–46 
(Albert P. Blaustein & Robert L. Zangrando eds., 1968)). 
225  60 U.S. 393, 452 (1856); see also Kevin Barry & Bharat Malkani, The Death Penalty’s 
Dark Side: A Response to Phyllis Goldfarb’s Matters of Strata, Race, Gender, and Class 
Structures in Capital Cases, WM. & MARY L. REV. ONLINE (“In Dred Scott v. Sanford, the U.S. 
Supreme Court explicitly sanctioned slavery, articulating a powerful defense of racial 
subordination that set the stage for the Civil War.”). 
226  HORACE GREELEY, THE AMERICAN CONFLICT, vol. I (1865). 
227  See id. at 12, 44–45, 47 (discussing “the radical injustice and iniquity of slave-holding” 
and the “fearfully misguided” men who fought to preserve the institution, and stating that 
“those provisions favoring or upholding Slavery, which deform our great charter, . . . are 
unsightly and abnormal additions” demanded by the “slave-hungry States of the extreme 
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The death penalty—which Greeley and other anti-slavery advocates also 
opposed228—is not yet history.  But it will be.  Although none of us can know 
for sure how history will judge the death penalty, odds are good that the death 
penalty will come to be seen as one of the worst indignities our Nation has 
ever known, and that a Supreme Court decision abolishing it will, in time, be 
widely accepted as right.  Odds are also good that many of us alive today will 
be there when history is made. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Abolition of the death penalty is inevitable.  Power, not principle, 
sustains it,229 and principle, not power, will eventually end it.230  Applying 
three themes that have characterized death penalty abolition in the Western 
world, this Essay has argued that the end of the death penalty hinges on the 
Supreme Court’s willingness to defy public opinion and live up to history’s 
demands. 
When the Supreme Court abolishes the death penalty, the Court will not 
be going it alone.  This Essay has gathered the opinions of federal and state 
judges who have advocated abolition of the death penalty for over the past 
half-century.  These decisions form a coherent body of law—the “law of 
abolition”—on which the Supreme Court should rely. 
 
South”).  President Obama repeated this sentiment in 2016.  See Remarks by the President in 
Eulogy for the Honorable Reverend Clementa Pinckney, THE WHITE HOUSE, (June 26, 2015), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/06/26/remarks-president-eulogy-
honorable-reverend-clementa-pinckney (“[T]he cause for which they fought—the cause of 
slavery—was wrong . . . .”). 
228  See Horace Greeley: Abolitionist with Pen in Hand, AFRICAN AMERICAN REGISTRY, 
http://www.aaregistry.org/historic_events/view/horace-greeley-abolitionist-pen-hand (last 
visited Oct. 24, 2016); cf. MANISHA SINHA, THE SLAVE’S CAUSE: A HISTORY OF ABOLITION 3 
(2016) (discussing slavery abolitionists’ anticipation of “contemporary scourges, criticizing 
the criminalization of blackness and the use of capital punishment and force by the state”). 
229  See ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 1, at 153 (“[E]xecutions represent a 
manifestation of state autonomy that continues to influence state and local decisionmakers.”).  
A case in point is Nebraska, whose legislature repealed the death penalty over the governor’s 
veto, and whose governor responded by funding a public referendum campaign that resulted 
in the reinstatement of the death penalty.  See Pema Levy, A Republican Governor Is Using 
His Own Money to Reinstate the Death Penalty, MOTHER JONES (Nov. 1, 2016) (stating that 
Nebraska governor “[Pete] Ricketts and his billionaire father, Republican megadonor Joe 
Ricketts, spent $300,000 on an effort to collect enough signatures to put the death penalty 
question to voters, in the form of a referendum on November 8.  The governor donated another 
$100,000 this fall to fund a campaign to sway voters to reinstate the death penalty”); see also 
Nebraska, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/nebraska-1 (last visited 
Oct. 24, 2016) (discussing reinstatement of the death penalty). 
230  See supra Part I.B (discussing “human rights linkage”). 
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The Court’s decision to abolish the death penalty will not be easy; one 
vote will most likely separate abolition from retention.  Nor will the decision 
be popular; indeed, abolition has never been the result of popular demand.231  




231  See HOOD & HOYLE, supra note 12, at 426. 
